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Abstract
Cloud computing is an important part of today’s world because offloading com-
putations is a method to reduce costs. In this paper, we investigate computing
the Speeded Up Robust Features (SURF) using Fully Homomorphic Encryption
(FHE). Performing SURF in FHE enables a method to offload the computations
while maintaining security and privacy of the original data. In support of this re-
search, we developed a framework to compute SURF via a rational number based
format compatible with FHE. Although floating point (R) to rational numbers (Q)
conversion introduces error, our research provides tight bounds on the magnitude
of error in terms of parameters of FHE. We empirically verified the proposed
method against a set of images at different sizes and showed that our framework
accurately computes most of the SURF keypoints in FHE.
1 Introduction
Cloud computers are a commonmodern day paradigm of offloading computations from
a local desktop to a server farm. Many of these cloud computing resources are honest
participants in terms of privacy and security. However, adversities can compromise an
honest cloud computing resource and the user loses the privacy of their data. This risk
can be mitigated by encrypting the data so that a compromise does not immediately
provide the private data to an adversity. However, processing encrypted data is not
straightforward. We defeat this threat by using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
as a method to process encrypted data and make use of a cloud computing resource
with some level of privacy.
Our focus on secure signal processing leads us to Speeded Up Robust Features
(SURF) [2] [3]. Our FHE-based solution takes in an image, encrypts it, generates
the scale space pyramid of SURF in an encrypted image, decrypts the pyramid, and
then extracts keypoints. Our key contribution is the computation of the scale space
pyramid in the encrypted domain. We do not perform the keypoint extraction in the
encrypted domain because FHE schemes do not currently provide a method to compare
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values in the encrypted domain. However, it is potentially an open problem to process
keypoints in the encrypted domain (particularly the LU decomposition for aligning the
keypoint). Another contribution of this paper is to use the integer space of FHE in a way
to process the feature extraction algorithm that uses real values. Our implementation
uses encrypted rational values in a clever way to allow the scale space pyramid to
be computed in the encrypted domain. We particularly focus on errors that can be
introduced by use of the rational format compared to a floating point representation.
The rational representation was chosen based on the ease of implementation in FHE.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a concept where processing of data is
conducted while the data is encrypted. FHE requires that the encrypted processing can
continue indefinitely. Additionally, FHE requires that the homomorphic operations oc-
cur over addition and multiplication. In the Related Works section, we identify some
additive-only encryption schemes. The first scheme capability of FHE was developed
by Gentry [8]. Additional schemes have been developed over the years. We use a
scheme developed in 2013 by Gentry, Sahai, and Waters [9] (called GSW2013). Se-
curity of the scheme is based on the learning with errors problem [15]. The GSW13
scheme provides important capabilities that we are going to use to implement secure
SURF. The scheme encrypts integers over a ring defined by a modulus q. Once en-
crypted, the integers can be added and multiplied together. Subtraction is available
with two’s compliment integers. There is also the capability to multiply an encrypted
ciphertext by a constant. These capabilities provide the building blocks to perform
secure SURF.
2 Related Work
Over the past decade growing interest in privacy has increased interest in secure signal
processing. Troncoso-Pastoriza and Perez-Gonzalez have an excellent survey of the
problems and solution techniques for privacy in cloud computing [18]. There are many
other examples among varying fields; secure signal processing [11], biometrics [19],
and [14]. Many specific examples exist that use the Paillier encryption scheme (see
[10] for scheme definition). This scheme is not an FHE scheme as it provides only
additive homomorphic operations (i.e. no ciphertext-ciphertext multiplication). FHE
schemes provide both additive and multiplicative operations over ciphertexts. Hsu,
Lu, and Pei used Paillier to implement a privacy preserving SIFT [10]. An encrypted
version of SURF also exists using the Paillier scheme [1]. The main difference here
is that we use FHE instead of Paillier. A few other examples of using Paillier exist in
signal processing [12] [13]. Other encryption techniques also exist; particularly with
two party computations while hiding data from both sides, ex. [16].
FHE schemes have been evolving since the first scheme was developed by Gentry
in 2009 [7]. Over the next few years, the schemes have improved both the time and
space complexity and went from binary number implementation to an integer ring [4]
[5] [6] [9]. Our choice of the 2013 scheme is due to its ability to process ciphertexts
within an integer ring. Other work has been done on using FHE in signal processing:
Shortell and Shokoufandeh used FHE to implement a brightness/contrast filter [17].
This implementation uses scaling factor representation vice a rational representation.
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We will show that our rational representation is more practical in comparison.
3 Construction of SURF in FHE
3.1 Numerical Format
As we mentioned, the FHE scheme only provides encryption, decryption, and process-
ing of integers within the ring Zq . Any mathematical function that requires real value
computations would not be natively possible in the FHE scheme. This requires the
need to represent real value in the integer ring. Multiple solutions exists such as a fixed
point factor with each solution having its own advantages and disadvantages. We chose
to use a rational representation of an integer pair because we can support many basic
operations (+,-,×,/) of fractional numbers.
Rational representation requires a tuple of two integers inside Zq . With rational
numbers (in Qq), we can represent a real value up to some approximation factor. This
will obviously introduce error into the calculations compared to floating point. The
formal representation of the format is
{u · v−1 | u, v ∈ Zq, v 6= 0} (1)
Using this model, rational addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division are all well
defined in terms of addition, subtraction, and multiplication of the individual integers
in the tuple. Since the FHE scheme supports these three operations, we can use a
rational format for secure SURF. This format has an advantage over a fixed point binary
format in that there are less computations to perform for computing the end result.
There is a major disadvantage of this format: ciphertexts do not have any idea what the
denominator (v) is and cannot be reduced with the numerator. So values greater than
one will always increase the denominator which will at one point overload the Zq space
and cause an incorrect value to be computed. We work around this potential issue by
making smart decisions to implement SURF in the encrypted domain.
3.2 SURF Implementation
We now focus on the detailed SURF implementation in FHE using the rational format.
For SURF, we need to carefully consider the expansion of the denominator in all calcu-
lations. Our first smart decision is to choose the initial image format to be integer only;
thus we start the denominator as one and remains at one until the entire integral image
is generated. This is very important as there are O(mn) operations for the integral
image (assuming an m × n image). The integral image is computed by starting at the
top, left point and moving towards the bottom, right point. We can generate in place
by copying the image and adding an initial encrypted zero row and column. Using a
simple equation, we are able to compute the entire integral image in O(n2).
inti,j = inti,j + int(i−1),j + inti,(j−1) − int(i−1),(j−1) (2)
We move on to computing the scale space pyramid of determinants and traces.
Just as in [2], we compute 2 × 2 Hessian matrix with assistance of Haar patterns.
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Omitting the details, we highlight here that we follow the same path of computing
regions from integral image for the Haar patterns to the Hessian matrix. We start with
computing regions first. The region summation benefits from the integral image having
denominator of one. This means the three or four computations will not increase the
denominator until the multiplier constants are used. Given four points of a rectangular
region (A, B, C, andD), we compute the sum as:
rsk = intA − intB − intC + intD, (3)
wherewe have used k to indicate a specific region. As wementioned, there will be three
(Dxx,Dyy) or four (Dxy) of these summations to be combined. The basic equation (for
Dxx orDyy) is
c1 · rs1 + c2 · rs2 + c3 · rs3, (4)
where the three constants are rational values depending on the current octave and layer
of the scale space pyramid. It is at this point in the computations that we introduce
a denominator greater than one. We control the denominator of our rational numbers
here by using a consistent denominator for the three constants and separating it out
from the additions:
1
v
· (c1,u · rs1 + c2,u · rs2 + c3,u · rs3) . (5)
Dxy uses a similar equation with an additional term. We will see the importance of
having a consistent v for all computations here for the determinant. Determinant is
computed as follows:
Dxx ·Dyy − 0.81 ·D
2
xy. (6)
Remembering we have a common denominator from the Haar patterns, we can extract
out the denominator to minimize growth. Using v from the previous paragraph:
1
v2
(
Dxx,u ·Dyy,u −
81
100
·Dxy,u ·Dxy,u
)
. (7)
Computing the trace is a very simple calculation given the Haar patterns. The equation
is
Dxx +Dyy, (8)
which does not require any denominator movement as this is a final equation that gets
decrypted.
Re-encryption As a final note, we need to discuss the expansion of the image size.
The FHE scheme only can support a certain number of homomorphic operations before
re-encryption is needed to refresh the ciphertext from decryption noise. Without this,
the noise will cause decryption to fail [9]. In the case of SURF, the longest sequence
of computations occurs during the integral image. Scale space pyramid’s computations
are more parallel in nature compared to the sequential nature of the integral image.
When the image size becomes larger, we can strategically refresh the ciphertext in
segments of the integral image.
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3.3 Detailed Error Analysis
Our rational format approach introduces errors into the computations. While floating
point numbers have limited accuracy, the inaccuracy can be so small that the user does
not notice it. We need to consider how our framework introduces errors and what needs
to be done to contain them. Therefore, we need to bound both the numerator and the
denominator within the FHE scheme’s limits. We develop a theorem to enable users
to understand what modulus must be selected in the FHE scheme to enable correct
computations. The FHE scheme used in this paper introduces error or noise in keys
that enables the encryption to be secure. This error/noise is not the same as our intro-
duced error and does not affect the rational numbers (until decryption fails) because
the plaintext integers are extracted correctly.
Introduction of Error Error is introduced when we convert from floating point to
rational. It is important to remember we strategically kept our initial image in integer
space, so we do not introduce additional error from computations. However, there are
two more locations in the process that will introduce error: the fractional constants that
are used when computingHaar patterns and constant 81100 that is used in the determinant
calculation. One concern with the error is balancing the numerator and denominator
bounds to obtain accurate results.
Lemma 1. Given the SURF implementation and an accuracy bounded by ∆, the total
error introduced will be
∆ ·B ·m · n · (3Dxx + 3Dyy − 0.81 · 8 ·Dxy)
for the determinant and
2 ·∆ ·B ·m · n
for the trace using an image size of m by n with integers in the integral image bounded
by B.
Proof. The error begins in the Haar pattern calculations (assuming accuracy is limited
by∆):
(c1 +∆) · r1 + (c2 +∆) · r2 + (c3 +∆) · r3. (9)
This means a single Haar pattern will introduce ∆ · (r1 + r2 + r3) error. Combining
these into the determinant equation:
= (Dxx +∆ · (r1 + r2 + r3)) · (Dyy +∆ · (r1 + r2 + r3))
−.81 · (Dxy +∆ · (r1 + r2 + r3 + r4))
2
(10)
= Dxx ·Dxy − .81 ·D
2
xy +∆ · (r1 + r2 + r3) · (Dxx +Dyy)
−.81 · (r1 + r2 + r3 + r4) · (Dxy +Dxy). (11)
We can convert the rxs to worst case values of B ·m · n to be the max possible value
they can be. Combining the error terms:
∆ · B ·m · n · (3Dxx + 3Dyy − 0.81 · 8 ·Dxy). (12)
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The trace equation is much easier. Starting with
Dxx +∆ · (r1 + r2 + r3) +Dyy +∆ · (r1 + r2 + r3), (13)
combining terms and using the max bound for the rxs, yields:
Dxx +Dyy + 2 ·∆ · B ·m · n. (14)
Denominator Bounding We need to bound the denominator. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2, we strategically selected the denominator in areas to minimize its ability to
increase. At the conclusion of the encrypted processing, we are calculating two values
using equations 7 and 8. Obviously, our bound needs to be the max of these two. While
it was easy to determine the values of the denominators, the real problem is the FHE
scheme’s max value. We generate this Lemma to support the FHE scheme.
Lemma 2. Given the SURF implementation and a base denominator of V , the max
value of the denominator is 100 · V 2
Proof. The integral image denominator is the same for the entire process which is
maintained for the region summations. The first strategic decision we made was to use
a common denominator and move it out of the additions to minimize the denominator
increase. Therefore when a Haar pattern has been computed, there will be a denomina-
tor set to a value V . From the trace equation (Eq. 8): knowledge of rational calculations
and a common denominator of V leads to a final denominator of V 2. Working on the
determinant equation, we strategically move the V 2 out of the computations (using the
common denominator from Haar patterns). The only remaining denominator is the 100
from the constant. This gives us a final denominator of 100 · V 2.
Numerator Bounding Our next focus is to bound the numerator of the determinant
and trace equations (7 and 8).
Lemma 3. Given the SURF implementation, the max value of the numerator is 1296 ·
B2 ·m2 · n2, where B is the bound on the integer values of the image, m × n is the
image size.
Proof. Again using Eqs. 7 and 8, we identify bounds separately. This requires deter-
mining the max values of the integral image, region sums, and Haar patterns. We can
independently work on bounding each individual Haar patterns and then going back to
the region sums and integral image. The trace numerator is
Dxx · V +Dyy · V. (15)
The determinant numerator is:
Dxx ·Dyy · 100− 81 ·Dxy ·Dxy. (16)
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In both cases, we need to determine the bounds for each of the Haar patterns. Dxx and
Dyy will have the same bound andDxy will be very similar. The numerator of theDxx
is
c1 · r1 + c2 · r2 + c3 · r3. (17)
For the integral image, an image of size m× n drives O(mn) calculations. Using
B as the bound on the integer space, we have B ·m · n as the bound of the max value.
Each point (rx) will be bounded above by the actual location; note that the constants cx
will add up to zero but the summation in Eq. 17 will not be zero. Since we are looking
for the worst case, the region sums will be just the size of the region. To bound this
from above, we will assume the constants are positive so that the region is a combined
sum. This means a less tight bound overall. We will designate the size of the region
in the worst case to be less than m · n; so that we can use this value as a bound. This
gives us a bound on theDxx (Dyy):
3 ·B ·m · n. (18)
Dxy is very similar:
4 ·B ·m · n. (19)
We can combine these two results into Eq. 16:
(3 ·B ·m · n) · (3 ·B ·m · n) · 100− 81 · (4 · B ·m · n)
2
, (20)
where we keep the two sides separate as if either one goes over the limit the calculation
will fail. Splitting Eq. 20, we obtain
900 · B2 ·m2 · n2 (21)
1296 · B2 ·m2 · n2. (22)
Obviously, the second equation will be the larger of the two and will be the one that
absolutely needs to be satisfied. Thus we have a bound on the numerator.
Modulus Theorem The importance of the following theorem is two-fold: first is
identifying error in the output of the scheme (accuracy) and second is bounding the
framework to properly select values to ensure proper output. A user can select a modu-
lus q and a rational fraction denominator V based on the size of the input image while
considering the need of SURF’s fractional values.
Theorem 1. FHE implementation of SURF correctly calculates the scale-space pyra-
mid with accuracy
∆ ·B ·m · n · (3Dxx + 3Dyy − 0.81 · 8 ·Dxy)
given that the following holds true:
100 · V 2 <
q
2
1296 ·B2 ·m2 · n2 <
q
2
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Figure 1: Set of 11 Test Images
Proof. Lemma 1 proves the accuracy equation. Next, the numerator and denominator
need to be bounded within the modulus ring of the FHE scheme. If the numerator or
denominator exceeds the modulus ring, the framework will not work. Remember that
q is the modulus of the ring and that negative numbers are enabled by two’s comple-
ment, so the numerator and denominator must be less than q2 . In Lemmas 2 and 3 we
determined the max value of the numerator and denominator of the final determinant
value. Using the modulus bound we have:
100 · V 2 <
q
2
(23)
1296 ·B2 ·m2 · n2 <
q
2
(24)
.
4 Results
We now wish to discuss the results of implementing the Secure SURF. We have two
focuses: first is on how well the keypoints can be extracted from the scale space pyra-
mid. Second is the time and space complexity of the implementation of FHE and thus
SURF.
Keypoint Comparison Since we are obtaining SURF keypoints from a scale space
pyramid computed in the encrypted domain, we need to compare them against an unen-
crypted version. For our test cases, we used a set of 11 images scaled down to 32× 32
and 64×64 in size. This arbitrary scaling was done to show the capability of the frame-
work. Our tests were setup with the FHE scheme having a ring modulus q of 2567 and
we set V = 10000.
We summarize our results in Table 1. In the 32 × 32 case, we saw that in ten out
of the eleven images the equivalent keypoints were found (a few not having keypoints
to be found). Investigating the only image which the encrypted algorithm found a
feature while the encrypted algorithm did not, we observed that the neighborhood of
the keypoint there was another location that had a value very close to the keypoint’s
response value. Figure 2 graphically displays intensities of the neighborhood. Clearly
the point in the top left corner from the layer below is showing to be very close to the
center point. We believe this to be introduced by the rational conversion error, but it
brings in the question of the stability of the unencrypted keypoint. As we moved into
64 × 64 images, we were able to see more differences caused by the initial rational
8
Table 1: Results of Keypoint Comparison
Size Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
32x32 Un. 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
Enc. 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
64x64 Un. 22 16 15 22 22 22 7 0 1 25 19
Enc. 19 14 11 19 19 22 8 0 2 20 17
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Figure 2: Intensity Map of the Encrypted and Unencrypted section of Image 3
error. If we sum up the total numbers compared to the original image, we see that we
are accurately computing about 82.5% of the original points.
Time/Space Complexity FHE is known to have poor time and space complexity. A
single ciphertext is represented by a O(N2) matrix (N is defined by FHE scheme).
This size drives the time complexity of the FHE operations. FHE addition is a matrix-
matrix addition that is a O(N2) operation. Multiplication is matrix-matrix multipli-
cation which is a O(N3) process. Since our scheme is mostly using additions and
multiplications, we are starting with a O(N3) process. One final note about subtrac-
tion is that a constant multiplication (-1) is performed, so a subtraction is a O(N3) as
well.
Starting with space complexity, we must remember we are working with an image.
This means we need space O(mnN2) to store a single image. For the scale space
pyramid, we know that each image can be at least m × n. However, when moving
through the octaves the size decreases by powers of two. We can bound the space
complexity on an upper bound byO(o · l ·m ·n ·N2), where we have used o to indicate
the number of octaves and l to be the number of layers per octave. We note that the
constant multiplier to this bound is a fractional value.
Looking at the time complexities, we have two processes to consider: the integral
image and the scale space pyramid. Generating of the integral image is a O(mn)
process that uses two additions and a subtraction for its calculations. This will yield
a O(mnN3) time complexity. Moving on to the scale space pyramid. We know from
the space complexity that there are O(o · l · m · n) points to calculate. Each point
is computed for both the determinant and trace via Haar patterns. Each of these is a
constant number of combination of additions, subtractions, and multiplications. This
means the computations in time are O(N3). For the scale-space pyramid, this means a
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time complexity of O(o · l ·m · n ·N3).
The space and time complexities need to be dealt with. Another important aspect
of SURF is that it can be easily parallelized. Each point of the scale-space pyramid
can be computed independently once the integral image has been calculated. Another
parallelizable part of this framework is the matrix-matrix multiplication of the FHE
scheme (we have successfully be able to use GPUs to significantly improve running
time). This enables an additional method to improve the scheme’s overall running
time.As a concrete example, we can compute a 64× 64 image in under eight hours by
using a 4-CPU Desktop computer with a GPU. An important takeaway of this section
is that complexity of FHE demands only a necessary amount of computations.
5 Conclusions
Performing SURF in the encrypted domain provides a method for a user to offload their
computations. Moving this computation to a cloud computer enables other potential
actions to be taken post the SURF process. One problem we did not solve was the
ability to identify the keypoints in the encrypted domain and be able to interpolate these
points. Other feature extraction algorithms could potentially be computed in FHE as a
result of this as well.
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